PUNNU RAM V. CHIRANJI LAL GUPTA (DEAD) BY L.RS., AIR 1999 SC 1094
FACT AND ISSUE:
In these appeals, the only question involved is whether the factors laid down in Section 19(4) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 are to be read as cumulatively or alternatively?
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Delhi High Court: has interpreted the S. 19(4) and arrived at the conclusion in the alternative and did not have to be read cumulatively.
It also held that the principal objective of the Act being clearance of slums and prevention and creation of slums, if in a given case the demolition or re-erection or reconstruction of a building or a set of buildings was necessary in the interest of slum clearance or improvement, the poverty of the tenant even if established would not debar the competent authority from granting permission.
The competent authority in considering the application for grant of permission moved by a landlord has to look at the matter from the point of view of the tenant and not from the point of view of the landlord, ever keeping in mind the objectives sought to be achieved by the Act.
This order is under challenge.
JUDGEMENT
The court referred to the case of Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi wherein the constitutional validity of s.19 of the Act was upheld, and observed that the Act was enacted for two purposes:
(i) the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories, and
(ii) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction.
While considering Chapter III which is headed "Slum Improvement" and Chapter IV which is headed "Slum Clearance and Redevelopment", the Court observed that in cases where the buildings and the entire area are to be ordered to be demolished, the dwellers would have to vacate but it is presumed that alternative accommodations would necessarily have to be provided before any such order is made. And the process would have to be carried out in an orderly fashion if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled and the policy behind it, i.e., the establishment of slum-dwellers in healthier and more comfortable tenements so as to improve the health and morals of the community, is to be achieved.
At the time of hearing, it is admitted that no rules are framed or guidelines are laid down prescribing other factors as contemplated by clause (c) of Section 19(4). Therefore, only two factors are required to be taken into consideration before granting or refusing to grant permission as contemplated by sub-section (3).
If the factor mentioned in clause (a) is satisfied, then there is no reason to hold that the second factor is also required to be satisfied before granting permission under sub-section (3).
Further, clause (b) provides that before granting such permission, the competent authority should be satisfied whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas and if it is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas, then permission for eviction can be granted. In such cases also, a tenant would not be put to any hardship if he is evicted. Because as observed by this Court in the case of Jyoti Pershad the policy of the enactment suggests that the slum-dwellers should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation to be made could be obtained for him. It is true that for some time alternative accommodation may not be provided to the tenant but it is required to be provided within a reasonable time.
Further, if the building is required by the owner for demolition or reconstruction or improvement, then Section 20-A takes care of the tenants.
Hence, for the abovementioned reasons, the finding given by the High Court that the tenant may not be provided with alternative accommodation is not only against the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Jyoti Pershad but also against the scheme of the Act.
However, the High Court was right in holding that the factors which are mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 19 are to be taken into account as alternative factors.
The appeals were therefore allowed.