C.R. ABROL V. ADMINISTRATOR UNDER THE SLUM AREAS (1970) RCJ 899
FACTS
The premises occupied by the petitioners in this and the connected writ petitions as tenants were formerly evacuee property and therefore, rents payable by these tenants were very low. The evacuee property was later acquired by the Government under section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and sold to one Smt. Sarla Gupta by public auction. The sale certificate was issued to Smt. Sarla Gupta. The petitioners admit Smt. Sarla Gupta to be their landlord.
The Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi, a Society not so registered both made an application under Section 19(1) of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act) to the Competent Authority for permission to evict the tenants alleging themselves to be the landlords vis-à-vis those tenants on the ground that the premises had been purchased in auction from the Government in reality by the Arya Samaj benami in the name of Smt. Sarla Gupta.
Later, the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi and Smt. Sarla Gupta had executed a deed of trust in favour of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab whereby the legal ownership of the property in premises vested in the trustees, namely, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab, the beneficial owner being the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi. Still later Smt. Sarla Gupta also executed a deed of disclaimer by which she disclaimed any title to the premises and admitted the legal title to be in the name of Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab.
The tenants resisted the petitions on the ground that they were the tenants of Smt. Sarla Gupta and pointed out that the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi was not a registered body and could not, therefore, maintain the petition against the tenants.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Competent Authority: held that the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab was not proved to be a registered body and the relationship of landlords and tenants between the parties was also not proved. Therefore, declined to grant permission to them for the eviction of the tenants.
Judicial Secretary: reversed the order of the Competent Authority and granted the permission for instituting proceedings for eviction of the tenants on the view that where a tenant denies his relationship with the alleged landlord filing the petition under Section 19, the permission must invariably be granted. The reason is that in granting permission in such cases neither party is put to any loss.
The tenants, therefore, filed these writ petitions challenging the order of the Judicial Secretary.
In opposing the writ petition Smt. Sarla Gupta herself filed the counter-affidavit on behalf of the two Arya Samaj bodies to show that she herself had never any title to the premises which were vested in the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab as the legal owner and in the Arya Samaj, Kishan Ganj, Delhi as the beneficial owner.
She further pointed out that the tenants had not paid arrears of rent for the last four years and that all the three tenants are, able to secure alternative accommodation within their means if they are evicted.
ISSUES
whether the Competent Authority under Section 19 were incompetent to grant permission to the landlords for the eviction of the tenants except after finding:
(1) that the relationship of landlords and tenants existed between the parties and
(2) that the tenants would be able to obtain alternative accommodation within their means after eviction.
JUDGEMENT
As per the first issue,
The court observed that, the protection given by Section 19 is available only to tenants. The Act does not define either “landlord” or “tenant”. It is clear, therefore, that the relationship of landlord and tenant has to be determined according to the general law.
A proceeding which can be brought only against a tenant as such must necessarily be by a landlord. Therefore, the Competent Authority was bound to make a preliminary inquiry into the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties under Section 19(1) with a view to be able to decide on the basis of such a preliminary inquiry whether permission should be given to the landlord to institute proceedings for the eviction of the tenant.
Court referred to the case of Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh Tata and observed that the preliminary inquiry by the Competent Authority is to be in summary.
As per the second issue,
Court analysed section 19(4) of the Act, and held that the two considerations therein S.19(4)(a) and (b) appear to be alternative and not cumulative. If the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas then the premises may have to be either demolished or improved by repairs. This would involve the vacation of the premises by the tenant even if the tenant is too poor to find accommodation within his means.
But if on the other hand, the eviction of the tenant is not necessitated by the demolition or repairs of the premises then the Competent Authority must consider if alternative accommodation within his means would be available to the tenant if he were evicted. If it comes to the conclusion that he would not find such alternative accommodation within his means then the Competent Authority is precluded from granting the permission for his eviction.
With great respect, it seems to us that the decision of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Parsad case should be sufficient to enable us to construe Section 19(4) as being mandatory and exhaustive even though such construction may prevent the landlord from evicting his tenant except on one of the grounds expressly mentioned therein.