JYOTI PERSHAD V. THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI, AIR 1961 SC 1602
FACTS
The petitioner after a prolonged litigation and having fulfilled all the conditions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, obtained decrees of ejectment against the tenants. In the mean-time the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act,1956, came into force and the petitioner in accordance with s. 19 of the said Slum Areas Act applied to the competent authority for permission to execute the decree, which was refused inter alia on the grounds of hardship to the tenants and the human aspect of the case.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appeals therefrom were also rejected.
The petitioner moved the Supreme Court for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the orders on the grounds that
(1) Section 19(3) of the Act vests an unguided, unfettered and uncontrolled power in an executive officer to withhold permission to execute a decree which a landlord has obtained after satisfying the reasonable requirements of the law as enacted in the Rent Control Act.
(2) Neither s. 19 of the Act nor any other provision of the Act indicates the grounds on which the competent authority might grant or withhold permission to execute decrees and the power conferred is, therefore, arbitrary and offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.
(3) The same point was urged in a slightly different form by saying that the Power conferred on the "competent authority" by s. 19(3) of the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative power and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
ISSUE
Is the Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act,1956, constitutionally valid?
JUDGEMENT
The court analysed the scheme and policy of the Act, and observed that,
The preamble describes the Act as one enacted for two purposes:
(1) the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories, and
(2) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction.
These twin objects are sought to be carried out by Chapters II to VI of the enactment.
So to answer first and second grounds, the court on the basis of the scheme, policy and objectives of the Act held that there is enough guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion under S. 19(1) of the Act and therefore, it was rejected that S.19 is obnoxious to the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.
On the third ground the court made two observations:
(1) In the context of modern conditions and the variety and complexity of the situations which present themselves for solution, it is not possible for the Legislature to envisage in detail every possibility and make provision for them. The Legislature therefore is forced to leave the authorities created by it an ample discretion limited, however, by the guidance afforded by the Act.
(2) If the power or discretion has been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating the law.
So long as the legislature indicates its purpose and lays down the policy it is not necessary that every detail of the application of the law to particular cases should be laid down in the enactment itself.
It is not at the "sweet-will and pleasure" of the competent authority that permission to evict could be granted or refused, but on principles gatherable from the enactment.
Before concluding, court considered it necessary to advert to a few points which were also urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner.
First it was said that the impugned s. 19 of the Act imposed a double restriction, a restriction super-imposed on a restriction already existing by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Control Act, and that this rendered it unreasonable.
Learned Counsel next drew court’s attention to s. 38 of the Rent Control Act which reads:
"The provisions of this Act and of the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law."
Court observed that if this section stood alone, the argument of learned Counsel that by reason of the width and sweep of its language, even a special legislation, such as the Act was comprehended within the non obstante provision would have required serious consideration, but that has been rendered unnecessary, because even apart from s. 19 of the Act which opens with the words: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force", s. 39 of the Act also contains a non obstante clause on the same lines as s. 38 of the Rent Control Act
The result therefore would be that the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is, will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent Control Act.
Therefore, none of the points urged in support of the petition has any substance. The petitions failed and was dismissed.