PUKHRAJ JAIN V. PADMA KASHYAP, AIR 1990 SC 77
FACTS
Tenant inducted in 1979 by the landlord under a written agreement, with permission of Controller u/s 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958, sought leave of the court on limited question of law.
ISSUE
If proceedings for recovery of possession under Section 21 of the Act could be initiated and continued by legal representatives of the landlord who had obtained permission but who died before expiry of period of tenancy?
JUDGEMENT
The court analysed the construction of the word ‘landlord’ used in Section 21 and the purpose and objective of it’s enactment.
Section 21 is an exception to Section 14 and it mandates restoration of possession, "notwithstanding any other law" it has to be construed strictly and against any attempt to frustrate it. It enjoins Controller to place landlord in vacant possession after expiry of time without any right to tenant to contest it except to the limited extent that permission was vitiated by fraud as held in S. B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khanna or misuse of the provision by landlord taking advantage of helpless situation of the tenant as held in V. S. Rahi v. Ram Chambeli or the permission really did not create genuine tenancy as held in Shiv Chand Kapoor v. Amar Bose.
Expression, "for the time being" makes it clear, that landlord has to be understood in praesenti. That is anyone entitled to receive rent is the landlord. It does not visualise past or future landlord. n, however, that landlord in second part of Section 21 entitling him to claim vacant possession should be confined to the person who obtained permission was founded on use of expression, "who does not require the whole or any part of the premises for a particular period". Attempt was made to personalise eviction proceedings by linking it with the person, due to whose nonrequirement the permission was granted resulting in automatic exclusion of legal representatives.
The Court observed that, S.21 of the Act t is in two parts one creation of short-term tenancy and other its execution after expiry of time. Both stand on their own and operate independently. once period expires the agreement, the permission all ceases to operate by operation of law. Nothing further is required. Vacation is not linked with landlord but with time. Expiry of it obliges tenant to vacate. If he does not then the landlord may approach Controller for putting him in vacant possession. Which landlord? Obviously whosoever is the landlord at the time of efflux of tenancy. Death of landlord does not either shorten or enlarge period nor are the consequences envisaged altered or affected.
Use of expression "notwithstanding any other law" renders it obligatory on tenant to vacate without questioning authority of landlord.
In Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, a decision which was relied by petitioner in support of submission that an application filed for eviction of a tenant on bona fide need lapses on the death of landlord and it could not be continued by his legal representatives was overruled in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chamanlal Maganlal Telwala, where it was observed that doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona did not apply to Rent Control Acts.
In the result this petition for special leave fails and is dismissed.