SP.ARORA V. AJIT SINGH, 1970 RCR 628
FACTS
The father of the appellant herein obtained a perpetual lease in respect of certain land from the Delhi Improvement Trust. One of the terms of the lease was that the lessee should erect upon the said land within one year from the date of the lease and thereafter at all times during the terms of the lease maintain on the land a good and substantial residential house. Another term was that the lessee should not use the said land and the building thereon during the term of the lease for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential use without the consent in writing of the Lesser, and it was stipulated that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than the purpose for which the lease was granted for being a purpose subsequently approved by the Lesser.
In September, 1953, the respondent took on rent the ground floor also from the appellant. According to the appellant, the ground floor was let out for residential purposes, while according to the respondent, the ground floor was let out for commercial purposes. In April, 1954, the respondent obtained connection for electrical power, and in June, 1955, he obtained a license for running a factory on the ground floor. If appears that the respondent began to run a factory known as Bangson Electronic Industries on the ground floor.
The notices were sent by the Delhi Improvement Trust to the Appellant and then by Appellant to the Respondent for the discontinuance of the use of the ground floor for commercial purposes but the respondent didn’t comply with them.
As the respondent did not remove the factory, the appellant herein filed an application on 15/11/1960, in the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi, under clauses (c) and (k)of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958, praying for eviction of the respondent from the ground floor.
Respondent contended that, he had been using the premises in dispute as a factory from the start of the tenancy, and that the appellant herein had been receiving rent and had, thus waived the objection, if any, to the user of the ground floor for the purpose of a factory.
ISSUE
Are the landlords estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes?
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rent Controller: He relied on the judgement of High Court of Punjab in Uma Kumari v. Jaswant Rai Chopra and held that as the ground floor was let out by the appellant herein to the respondent for the purpose of a factory and he himself committed the breach of the condition of the lease between himself and the Delhi Development Authority, he could not now ask his tenant to quit or to change the user, and that the respondent could not, therefore, be ejected on the ground specified in clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section(1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In the result, the Rent Controller dismissed the application
Rent Control Tribunal: agreed with the decision of the Rent Controller.
JUDGEMENT
The Court observed that, by leasing out the premises for a purpose which is contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land, the landlord is only committing a breach of a contractual term. So far as clause (k) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is concerned, it does not expressly prohibit the landlord from entering into such a transaction. It only enables the landlord to seek for the eviction of his tenant in a case in which the tenant uses the premises in a manner contrary to the condition in the lease deed for the land on which the premises are situate. Once he so agrees and waives the right given to him under clause (k), he would be stopped from enforcing that right.
The agreement to an user by the tenant contrary to the conditions the lease deed for the land amounts to a representation that he would not exercise his right to evict on the ground of such user, and when the tenant acts in pursuance thereof and changes his position by using the property in that manner incurring expenses in connection therewith, the principle of estoppel would be attracted and the landlord would be stopped from seeking to enforce the right to evict given to him under clause (k).
For the above reasons, it has to be held that the Rent Control Tribunal and the Rent Controller rightly decided that the respondent was not liable to be evicted on the ground mentioned in clause (k) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
The second appeal, therefore, failed and was dismissed.