RAVI DUTT SHARMA V. RATAN LAL BHARGAVA , AIR 1984 SC 967
FACTS
In the special leave petition, the houses for which eviction has been asked for in the two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of permission from the Competent Authority under the Slum Act. Under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit is not maintainable.
This argument was countered by the respondent on the ground that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976, new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenants - one of which was covered by Section 14(1)(e) and the other by Section 14-A.
So far as suits for eviction on the ground of personal necessity were concerned, the case for eviction was put at par with suits under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure, where the court was satisfied that the tenant had an arguable case, leave to defend would be granted; otherwise, the order of eviction would be passed straightway.
ISSUE
Are Sections 25-A and 25-B ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and inconsistent with the Slum Clearance Act which was an existing statute?
JUDGEMENT
The court observed that,
For resolving the conflicts, one test is that, the latter enactment must prevail over the earlier one.
It is clear from the new provision in the Amending Act that the procedure indicated therein was intended to have overriding effect and all procedural laws were to give way to the new procedure. Applications under Section 14(1)(e), therefore, clearly fell within the protective umbrella of the new procedure in Chapter III-A.
The court referred to the case of Smt. Krishna Devi Nigam v. Shyam Babu Gupta, In this decision it has been clearly held that the provisions of Section 25-A cannot be controlled by the provisions of the Slum Act.
Therefore, the court reached to the following conclusions:
(1) That Sections 14-A, 25-A, 25-B and 25-C of the Rent Act are special provisions so far as the landlord and tenant are concerned and in view of the non obstante clause these provisions would override the existing law so far as the new procedure is concerned;
(2) That there is no difference either on principle or in law between Sections 14(1)(e) and 14-A of the Rent Act even though these two provisions relate to eviction of tenant under different situations;
(3) That the procedure incorporated in Chapter III-A of the Amending Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution;
(4) That in view of the procedure in Chapter III-A of the Rent Act, the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is not, therefore, necessary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Competent Authority under Section 19(1) (a) of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for eviction and coming within Section 14(1) (e) or 14-A of the Rent Act.
Therefore, the court held that the High Court was correct in rejecting applications of the tenants for setting aside the order of eviction. The appeal was dismissed.