JAGANNATH V. RAM KISHAN DAS AIR 1985 SC 265

 

JAGANNATH V. RAM KISHAN DAS, AIR 1985 SC 265

FACTS

The appellant is a tenant of the respondents in respect of one room in a house at Kamla Nagar, New Delhi. The rent of the room is Rs. 10 per month. On March 19, 1967, the respondents filed an application for possession of the room on two grounds:

  • that the appellant was in arrears of rent and,
  • that they required the room bona fide for their own use and occupation.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rent Controller: An order was passed u/s 14(2) r/w S. 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958, calling upon the appellant to pay or deposit the arrears of rent within one month.

The appellant complied with the order but respondents withdrew the ejectment application, to file new application as they had not given to the appellant a notice to quit u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The respondents then gave a notice to quit to the appellant, terminating his tenancy w.e.f. May 9, 1968. On May 13,1968, respondents filed a fresh application for possession against the appellant on the ground that they required the room bona fide for their personal use.

That application was dismissed on February 14, 1969.

On March 9, 1971 respondents filed the instant application against the appellant for possession of the room on the ground that the appellant was in arrears of rent from April 1968 until March 1971.

Additional Rent Controller: refused to pass an order under Section 15(1) of the Act on the ground that such a benefit was given to the appellant in the first eviction petition and that, by reason of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, the appellant could not claim that benefit once again. In that view of the matter, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the appellant.

Rent Control Tribunal: took the view that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provision contained in Section 14(2) of the Act and that, the proviso to that sub-section had no application because, the benefit of the provision contained in Section 14(2) was being availed of by the appellant for the first time in the present proceedings. According to the Tribunal, the first ejectment application filed by the respondents against the appellant was dismissed because, respondents asked for leave to withdraw that application with liberty to file a fresh application on the ground that they had not served a notice to quit on the appellant, and not on the ground that the appellant had complied with the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Act.

High Court: Set aside the judgement of the Rent Control Tribunal.

ISSUE

 Whether the judgement of the high court is correct?

JUDGEMENT

The court observed that, the proviso to S. 14 (2) can be attracted only if it is shown that the tenant has attained the benefit of the provision contained in that section and not otherwise. It also referred to the view taken in Rama Gupta v. Raj Singh Kain that t since the landlord had withdrawn the earlier eviction petition, it could not be said that the tenant had derived a benefit under Section 14(2) of the Act.

The court then referred to the decision in Ashok Kumar v. Ram Gopal, the landlord therein had filed an application under Section 14(1)(a) in 1973 for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent. The Rent Controller passed an order under Section 15(1) which was duly complied with the tenant. Thereupon the landlord's application was dismissed by the Controller. In May 1979, the landlord filed another petition for possession against the tenant on the ground that he had committed default in the payment of rent. It was held by Kirpal J., and rightly, that since the tenant had obtained the benefit of Section 14(2) in the previous ejectment application he was not entitled to the benefit of that section once again.

Therefore, Appeal was allowed and the judgement of the High Court was set aside and that of the Rent Control Tribunal was restored with the modification that the period of one month for depositing the arrears of rent shall be computed from the date of this judgement.