R.S. RUIKAR V. EMPEROR AIR 1935 NAG. 149

R.S. RUIKAR V. EMPEROR AIR 1935 NAG. 149

 

FACTS

1. The Nagpur Textile Union of which the applicant is the President had determined on a strike of textile workers in Nagpur, the ground being that certain conditions in the terms of settlement of a strike in the previous year 1933 had been evaded by the Empress Mills in Nagpur. The strike was ordered, but did not at first meet with the response which the union desired and consequently a system of picketing was inaugurated.
2. On 3rd, 4th and 6th May 1934 the applicant made speeches supporting the strike and in the course of his speeches advocated and encouraged the picketing of the mills and called for volunteers to carry on the picketing.
3. On the morning of 5th May as a result of a complaint made by some of the strike committee that two women picketers had been harassed by the police and driven away, the applicant brought his wife to one of the mill gates and posted her there with instructions to beat, with her slippers, any one who interfered with her.
4. Charges were framed under four heads, three relating to the speeches delivered on 3rd, 4th and 6th May 1934 and the fourth relating to the incident of the abetment of picketing by his wife on 5th May.
5. Proceedings were taken against the applicant on 7th May under S. 107, Criminal P.C., and it was admitted that after that there were no further activities on his part. He was not however arrested for the offences of which he had been charged and of which he had been convicted until the 16th May. The proceedings under S. 107, Criminal P.C., were in abeyance.

 

ISSUE

Whether S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932) can have application to industrial disputes?

 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

The following contentions were laid down by the applicant:

1. The principal contention was that on the facts found against him in trial and in appeal no offence had been committed as S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932) could have no application to purely industrial disputes.

The decision in Shantanand Gir v. Basudevanand Gir [AIR 1930 All 225] was cited as authority for the proposition that such reference was permissible.

1. That a perusal of the Act as a whole without any reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons would indicate that S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act was to be utilised only on occasions of combating undertakings which are subversive to the Government.
2. At the time the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed by the Central Legislature, assurances were given that S. 7 would not be employed in the case of industrial disputes.
3.  That the ordinance out of which S. 7 arose was enacted with the particular purpose of combating the Civil Disobedience Movement.
4. That there was a definite conflict between S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Trade Unions Act of 1926. It was contended that the valuable right given to Trade Unions to declare a strike and their immunity from liability for criminal conspiracy or to civil suits in connection with the furtherance of a strike was taken away if S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act, was held to be applicable to trade disputes.
5. Shantanand Gir v. Basudevanand Gir [AIR 1930 All 225] was cited as authority for the proposition that such reference was permissible, and old cases from the C.P. Law Reports were cited to show that Judges have made references to Statement of Objects and Reasons in the past for the purpose of interpreting the law.
6. The only other case cited by the applicant was Administrator General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick [AIR 1922 Cal 788] and it was contended that their Lordships of the Privy Council, when holding that proceedings of the legislature in passing a statute were excluded from consideration on the judicial construction of Indian statutes, thereby implied that a reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible.

 

RATIONALE

1. The section itself made no limitation in respect of the parties disputing or the nature of the disputes giving rise to a situation where picketing was employed, and from the wording of the section itself it was clear that its application was universal.
2. Although the bulk of the sections in the Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932) did refer to activities subversive to Government and that the Act was a consolidation of some ordinance which had been issued from time to time and which the legislature considered necessary to embody as part of the law, but that in itself did not show that S. 7 could not be of universal application.
3. In interpreting the section this Court was precluded from considering any statements made in the Legislative Assembly or elsewhere on behalf of Government.
4. Neither the ordinance nor the present Act laid down any limitation as to the circumstances in which molestation becomes an offence. At the time of the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 certain persons discovered a gap in the Indian Penal Code whereby they were enabled to commit acts of intimidation which were not  punishable by law. Proceedings taken to remedy this deficiency were not directed personally against such persons who were influenced by motives hostile to Government, but remedied the defect in law which left open the way for any person who so chose to bring unwarranted pressure on another person whatever his motive might be. The absence of any provision preventing molestation was recognised as a definite lacuna in the Criminal law and an enactment was made to remedy it. That the defect was discovered by the ingenuity of persons taking part in the Civil Disobedience Movement did not limit the universal applicability of the remedy.
5. There was no such conflict between S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Trade Unions Act of 1926. Trade Unions had the right to declare strike and to do certain acts in furtherance of trade disputes. They were not liable civilly for such acts or criminally for conspiracy in the furtherance of such acts as Trade Unions Act permits, but there was nothing in that Act which apart from immunity from criminal conspiracy allowed immunity from any criminal offences. Indeed any agreement to commit an offence would, under S. 17, Trade Unions Act, make them liable for criminal conspiracy.

 

HELD

The Court held that Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act defined a criminal offence of universal application without restriction and it must be interpreted according to its plain and obvious meaning, and as it defined a criminal offence it was not in conflict with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, which remained unimpaired by S. 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act.

In abetting the commission of this offence, an offence which was undoubtedly committed, the applicant had been correctly convicted.