UNION OF INDIA V. FILIP TIAGO DE GAMA OF VEDEM VASCO DE GAMA
(1990) 1 SCC 277
FACTS
By notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 published in the government gazette on October 26, 1967, the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land belonging to the Respondent for establishing Naval Air Station Dabolim. On February 23, 1968, notification under Section 6 was published in the gazette. On March 5, 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared award determining compensation at the rate of 40 paise per square metre with solatium at 15 per cent. The claimant had sought reference under Section 18 of the Act and reference was duly made to the civil court (District Judge). On May 28, 1985, the court after investigation of the claim awarded compensation at Rs 3 per square metre. The court also awarded solatium at 15 percent and interest at 6 percent from the date of taking possession till payment of compensation. However, not being satisfied by the award awarded by the district judge, the claimant preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking further enhancement of compensation and also solatium at 30 per cent.
ISSUE
There were two issues being dealt by this court in the current case.
- Whether the Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 providing for higher solatium proprio vigore applies to award made subsequent to September 24, 1984 even though the acquisition commenced prior to the said date.
- Whether the applicability Section 23(1-A) provides additional compensation to awards made in such acquisition proceedings.
RULE
Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 provides the solatium at 30% raised from solatium standing at 15% before the amendment of 1984. Therefore Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 states that “In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the court shall in every case award a sum of 30 percent on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.”
Section 30(1) of the act states that “The provision of sub-Section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by Section 15(a) of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to (a) very proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April 1982 in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date. (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.”
Section 30(2) of the act states that “The provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 and before the commencement of this Act.”
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT
The high court had granted additional three reliefs to the claimant i.e. (i) Additional amount at the rate of 12 percent of the market value from the date of notification under Section 4 till the date of taking over possession; (ii) interest at the rate of 9 per cent for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subsequent years; and (iii) solatium at 30 per cent on the market value.
JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
- It was observed that the paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. As Justice Holmes rightly said, “Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged”
- While examining the first issue, this Hon'ble court dealt with the scope of Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984. It was first explained in K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer wherein A two Judge bench held that the award of 30 per cent solatium will apply only where the award appealed against was made by the Collector or court during the period between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. This decision was rendered on February 14, 1985. However, Kamalajammanniavaru was overruled by Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh wherein it was held that even if an award is made by the Collector or court on or before April 30, 1982, and an appeal against such award is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court on April 30, 1982 or is filed subsequent to that date, 30 per cent solatium under Section 23(2) should be allowed.
- This Hon'ble stated that even though these judgements had rested the controversy as to entitlement of higher solatium to cases pending as on the date of commencement of the Amending Act, they didn't solve the problem at hand. The award with which this Hon'ble court was concerned did not fall within the interregnum i.e. between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984.
- The court also observed that Section 23(2) forms part of a scheme of determining compensation for land acquired under the Act. It provides 30 per cent solatium on the market value of the land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. It thus operates on the market value of the land acquired. The market value of the land is required to be determined at the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and cannot be determined with reference to any other date. Hence, Section 23(2) in itself has no retrospective operation and if it isn't covered by Section 30(2), amended Section 23(2) has no role to play. The court also emphasised upon Section 30(2) i.e. Transitional provisions. The purpose of incorporating Transitional Provisions in any Act or amendment was simply to clarify when and how the operative parts of the enactments were to take effect. The Transitional Provisions generally were intended to take care of the events during the period of transition.
- The court examined that under Section 30(2) the benefit of higher solatium was available to the first award and not to the second. For instance, if the proceedings were initiated in 1960 and the award was made on 1st May, 1982, the amended Section 23(2) would apply. But if the proceedings were initiated on 23rd September, 1984 and the award was applied in 1989, the amended Section would apply. Such a construction of Section 30(2) would be vulnerable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided. Therefore, the purpose of Section 30(2) would be highlighted and Section 23(2) of the act would be applied in the current scenario.
- This Hon'ble court also examined the second issue wherein it stated that the entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(12DA) depended upon the pendency of acquisition proceedings till 30th April, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30(1)(a) stated that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) would be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on April 30, 1982 wherein he hasn't made the award. If the Collector would have made the award before that date then, that additional amount couldn't be awarded. Section 30(1)(b) further states that Section 23(1-A) would be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after April 30, 1982 irrespective of whether the Collector had made an award or not before September 24, 1984.
- In the present case, the proceedings had begun before 30th April, 1982 and no proceedings were pending before the Collector as on 30th April, 1982, therefore the scenario wasn’t attracting Section 30(1)(a) or Section 30(1)(b). The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A)
RELEVANT THEORY
The Golden Rule is a rule wherein the words of a statute must be given their ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of the words should not be departed from unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning. It is a rule considered as the modified principle of the grammatical interpretation. As observed in the Sussex Peerage “The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to explain the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such cases, best declare the intention of the law-giver.” Parke J. observed in Becke v Smith that “If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgement, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the cas