MANOHAR LAL V. STATE OF PUNJAB (1961) 2 SCR 343: AIR 1961 SC 418

 

MANOHAR LAL V. STATE OF PUNJAB

(1961) 2 SCR 343: AIR 1961 SC 418

FACTS

The Appellant, who was a shopkeeper, was convicted for contravening the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940. Under the act, he was required to keep his shop closed on the day he chose as his “close day”. He contended that the act did not apply to him as he didn’t employ any stranger to work for him, rather he worked alone.

ISSUE

The issue addressed in the current scenario was regarding the Constitutionality of Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940.

RULE

Section 7 of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940 states that “(1) Save as otherwise provided by this Act, every shop or commercial establishment shall remain closed on a close day and (2)(i) The choice of a close day shall rest with the occupier of a shop or commercial establishment and shall be intimated to the prescribed authority within two months of the date on which this Act comes into force.”

DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT

The Appellant approached the Hon'ble High Court to revise the order of the Additional District Magistrate who rejected the plea raised by the Appellant regarding the Constitutionality of Section 7(1) in its application to shops where no “employees” were engaged and sentenced him to a fine of Rs 100 and simple imprisonment in default of payment of the fine. The Hon'ble High Court dismissed the plea but granted a certificate of fitness that enabled the Appellant to file an appeal in this court.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

1. The court observed that the submissions of the learned counsel should be repelled. The long title of the aforementioned Act and on which the learned Counsel has placed considerable reliance as a guide for the determination of the scope of the Act and the policy underlying the legislation, indicates the main purposes of the enactment but cannot control the express operative provisions of the Act, for instance Section 7(1).
2. The ratio of the legislation is social interest in the health of the worker who forms an essential part of the community and in whose welfare the community is vitally interested. The court observed that the purpose of the act is the welfare of the workers. For instance, Section 7(4) employers are injuncted from employing persons who had already worked for the maximum number of permitted hours in another establishment and Section 7(5) lays an embargo on the worker himself from injuring his health by overwork in an endeavour to earn more. If such conditions were necessary in the case of a worker, there does not seem to be anything unreasonable in applying the same or similar principles to the employer who works on his own business. The legislation ensures that the businesses carried on - regulated in the health and welfare are not merely for those employed but also for those engaged in it. Hence a restriction imposed with a view to secure the purpose would be saved by Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
3. This Hon'ble court held that the long title indicates the purpose of the act but cannot control the express operative provisions of the act, such as Section 7(1). The purpose of the legislation is social interest in the health of the worker who forms an essential part of the community and in whose welfare, the community is interested. The act is concerned with the welfare of the worker and seeks to prevent injury to him, from the actions of both- his and his employer’s.
4. This court finally repelled the attack on the Constitutionality of Section 7(1) of the Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940.

RELEVANT THEORY

Words are the skin of language. Language gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law. It does so by employing appropriate phraseology to attain the object that the legislative policy seeks to achieve. Here, when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such a construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. But where such a plain reading leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, the court may look into the purpose for which the statute was enacted and try to interpret it so as to adhere to the purpose of the statute. It further mentions that if words are to be added by the court in order to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law.