STATE OF MYSORE V. R.V. BIDAP
(1974) 3 SCC 337
FACTS
Shri Bidap, the Respondent, was appointed as Member of the State Public Service Commission by the Governor of Mysore. While his term was still running, the governor appointed him the Chairman of the Commission. The State held that his tenure of six years issued to him under article 316(2) of the Constitution began whence he was appointed as a member and did not receive a fresh start whence he was appointed as a chairman.
ISSUE
Whether the member can be appointed as a chairman after his term of six years as a member is over if he has surpassed the age of sixty years?
RULE
Article 316 of the Indian Constitution deals with the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Commission, their term of office and their ineligibility for re-appointment and Article 319 of the Indian Constitution deals with prohibition, with narrow exceptions against further employment in State service. Concern for purity of the office and vulnerability to abuse of powers are writ large on these provisions.
JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
- This Hon'ble court observed that the working life of an Indian official in administration is generally several times the six short years granted to a Public Service Commission Member under Article 316(2). Further, the employment in public service wasn’t unusual for superannuated officers. Yet, there is substantial prohibition of subsequent employment in public service of Commission Members written into the Constitution by Article 319. The prospect and peril of the Executive tempting with renewals of membership to influence the incumbents may corrupt that institution which must zealously be kept above suspicion. This view gains strength from the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, particularly the speech of Dr Ambedkar.
- However, this court referred to the Anglo-American jurisprudence that normally frowned upon the use of parliamentary debates and press discussions as throwing light upon the meaning of statutory provisions. This Hon'ble court relied on the observation of Justice Franfurter regarding the Rule of Exclusion. He observed that “If the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded, and yet, the Rule of Exclusion, which is generally followed in England, insists that, in interpreting statutes, the proceedings in the Legislatures, including speeches delivered when the statute was discussed and adopted, cannot be cited in courts.” it was observed that an imminent Indian Jurist agreed with the opinions of Justice Frankfurter. He stated that nobody suggests that such extrinsic materials should be decisive but they must be admissible. Authorship and interpretation should mutually illuminate and interact.
- This Hon'ble court referred to the judgement AIR 1966 Cat 290 given by the Calcutta High Court wherein the majority opinion was that the the term of office of six years was to be computed from the date of the appointment as Member of the Commission and if during his office, he was made Chairman, his term would end after the end of first six years. Whereas the Minority opinion took a contrary view and focused a harmonious reading of Articles 316 and 319. It stated that once the member became a chairman, a new term for his appointment was inaugurated. It was observed that the Mysore High Court and the Orissa High Court relatively followed the minority opinion of the Calcutta High Court and disregarded the majority opinion.
- The court observed that according to articles 316 it observed that “A Chairman is also a member” as the first words of the article. Now as both were members, they normally hold separate offices. The article further sanctions the holding of an office by a member for six years “from the date on which he enters upon his office”. It was further emphasised that a member and a chairman have duties which were separate from each other in the office. They hold different offices even though both were regarded as members. The prescription of the terminus a quo in article 316(2) is ‘from the date on which he enters upon his office’ which, in the case of a Chairman appointed directly as such or originally as member and later elevated as Chairman, begins when he starts functioning as a Chairman.
- The court further observed the ambit and limitations of Article 319. It primarily enumerates the prohibitions attached to the holders of offices of Chairman and member of Public Service Commissions. The court was primarily concerned with article 319(d) which states that a member of the Public Service Commission of a State on ceasing to hold office is eligible for appointment as Chairman of that Commission. Normally when a member has completed the term of his office, he ceases to hold office, according to article 316(2) however, he can be eligible to hold the post of Chairman under article 319. Here article 316(2) is not breached because there is a six year term for each office and article 316(3) isn’t breached because the office of member is different from the office of the Chairman and so there is no un-appointment to that office when a member is made Chairman.
- The court further clarified that the member can be appointed as a chairman if his term of six years ends, however he cannot be appointed if he has surpassed the age of sixty years. Article 316(2) mentions that the member shall hold office for a term of six years or till he attains the age of sixty, whichever is lower. Hence, if he is appointed past sixty years, the appointment would be still borne as it is against the provisions of article 316(2) and they cannot serve indefinitely. Hence, this Hon'ble court has held that even though the term of six years of a member appointed as a chairman, the member cannot be appointed as a chairman once he’s surpassed the age of sixty years.
RELEVANT THEORY
Purposive Construction discusses the importance of the purport and object of the act. It also states that a statute must be read in its entirety and purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying principles of purposive construction. A purposive construction promoting the object of the enactment but not extending its sweep beyond the frontiers within which it was intended to operate must be adopted keeping in view that a construction which exempts a person from its operation must be preferred to the one which includes him in it, in view of the penal nature of the statue. It is normally based on three components namely, language, purpose and discretion. It is the duty of the courts to accept a construction which promotes the object of the legislation and also prevents its possible abuse even though the mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its Constitutionality or construction. Abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance and monitoring of individual cases and this can be done by screening of the cases by suitable machinery at a high level. Further, Purposive construction can only be resorted to when language of a provision is capable of more than one interpretation. Where literal construction or plain meaning may cause hardship, futility, absurdity or uncertainty, the purposive or contextual construction may be preferred to arrive at a more just, reasonable and sensible result.