JUGALKISHORE V. RAW COTTON CO. AIR 1955 SC 376

JUGALKISHORE V. RAW COTTON CO.

AIR 1955 SC 376

FACTS

Two persons filed a suit against the Appellant for the recovery of money and during the pendency of the suit transferred the debt to the Respondents. However, there was no mention of the suit or the decree that could be passed in it. After the decree was passed the Respondents sought to execute the decree under Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though it was held that the Respondents could execute the decree under Order 21 Rule 16, they weren’t assignees of the decree by instrument in writing or by operation in law.

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current case was can the Respondents claim to be the transferees of the decree within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure

RULE

Order 21 Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code states that

“Where a decree or, if a decree has been passed jointly in favour of two or more persons the interest of any decree-holder in the decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder:

Provided that, where the decree or such interest as aforesaid, has been transferred by assignment, notice of such application shall be given to the transferor and the judgement-debtor, and the decree shall not be executed until the Court has heard their objections (if any) to its execution:

Provided also that, where a decree for the payment of money against two or more persons has been transferred to one of them, it shall not be executed against the others.”

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

1. This Hon'ble court observed that the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally by giving the words their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning. If such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible to another meaning, the court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. In the present case a literal construction of the rule leads to no apparent absurdity and, therefore, there can be no compelling reason for departing from that golden rule of construction.
2. The court examined that if Order 21 Rule 16 was construed, the Respondent company couldn’t contend that the decree was after their passing transferred to them by an assignment in writing within the meaning of the rule, as the document in question was executed 7-2-1949 but the decree was passed subsequently on 15- 12-1949. There was no mention in the document of any suit or decree to be passed in the suit whether the parties really intended to transfer the future decree as well.
3. The court observed that the transfer of the debt passed all the interest which the transferors were ‘then’ capable of passing in the debt and in the legal incidents. There was ‘then’ no decree in existence due to which, the transferors could not ‘then’ pass any interest in the non-existing decree. This shows that the Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act didn’t assist the Respondent company. Upon the assignment of the debt the Respondent company undoubtedly became entitled to get themselves substituted under Order 21 Rule 10 as plaintiffs in the pending suit but they did not choose to do so and allowed the transferors to continue the suit and a decree to be passed in their favour. Hence, it was concluded by this Hon'ble court that at the date of the transfer of the debt to the Respondent company the transferors could not transfer the decree, because the decree did not exist.

RELEVANT THEORY

The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first principle of interpretation. According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning if it is clear and unambiguous. Where wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, the rule of literal construction is  applied and recourse to other principles of interpretation is not required. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or they suggest a contrary meaning. Where the meaning of a word or expression is not clear, the literal rule of interpretation is not applicable. Ordinarily, court should not depart from literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible.Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of interpretation may be applied.