PADMA SUNDARA RAO V. STATE OF T.N. (2002) 3 SCC 533

PADMA SUNDARA RAO V. STATE OF T.N.

(2002) 3 SCC 533

FACTS

In the current case, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued and the declaration was made prior to the substitution of the existing proviso to Section 6(1) i.e. the notification was issued before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, but after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967. The notification under Section 6(1) was made and published in the Official Gazette within the period of three years prescribed under the proviso, and undisputedly, the same was quashed by the High Court in an earlier proceeding. The notification involving the notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was questioned before the Madras High Court which relied on the decision of a three-Judge Bench in N. Nvalisimhaiah v. State of Karnataka

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current case deals with whether after quashing the notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under Section 6 of the said act.

RULE

Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 discusses the declaration that land is required for a public purpose.  “It states that

(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A sub-Section

(2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A (2):

Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4(1) -(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.

Explanation. - In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 (1), is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.”

JUDGEMENTS THE AFOREMENTIONED CASE REFERRED

Narasimhaiah judgement was a three bench judgement that was heavily referred to and influenced the entire process of the decision making of the current and past courts that dealt with the current case in hand. It stated that if the construction as put up by the learned counsel for the Appellants was given acceptance i.e. it should be within one year from the last of the dates of publication under Section 4(1), the public purpose would always be frustrated. Similarly, State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah also followed the view as mentioned in Narasimhaiah and held that the limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would start running from the date of receipt of the order of the High Court and not from the date on which the original publication under Section 4(1) came to be made.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

1. This Hon'ble court stated that a well settled principle in law exists which states that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. It further emphasised that the language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of a legislative intent. Therefore, the primary principle of construction was that the intention of the legislature must be found within the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said.
2. This court observed that courts normally shouldn’t put reliance on decisions without discussing and ensuring how the facts of the case in hand fit with the facts of the decision that was being referred to by the court. It was further observed by this Hon'ble court that the stipulation regarding the urgency of Section 5A of this act had no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was being pondered over. It seemed that the purpose of providing the period of limitation was a means of avoidance of inconvenience to an individual whose land was required to be acquired. It provided that the market value of the land was essential to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act showing that the prescription of the time-limit in the background was therefore pre-emptory in nature. It was further observed in Ram Chand v. Union of India that if no time limit was prescribed, a reasonable time limit was followed.
3. The court was deemed to interpret the law and not legislate it. If the provision of the law was being misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it was for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretive process. Language of Section 6(1) was plain and unambiguous and there was no scope for reading something into it as was done in the Narasimhaiah case. In the Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court’s order. Such a view couldn't be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the above view was accepted it would mean that a case could be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period which was never the legislative intent.
4. The court finally held that the two principles of construction, reading the statute as a whole and casus omisus was well settled. Casus omisus couldn't be supplied by the court except in the case of immense necessity and when its reason was found within the four corners of the statute itself. Moreover, the principle should not be readily inferred. This could be achieved if all the parts of the statute and Section be construed and with reference to the context and other clauses so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if the literal construction of the particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. Furthermore, the view expressed in Narasimhaiah case and Nanjudaiah case was not correct and shouldn't be followed in the current judgement as held by this Hon'ble court. However, it was observed that the substance in the pleas that have attained finality shouldn’t be opened and the present judgement was required to be enacted prospectively.