SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU V. STATE OF MYSORE 1958 SCR 895: AIR 1958 SC 255<

SRI VENKATARAMANA DEVARU V. STATE OF MYSORE

1958 SCR 895: AIR 1958 SC 255

FACTS

South District of Kanara consisted of three villages Mannampady, Bappanad and Karnad collectively known as Moolky Petah. In the village Mannampady, there exists an ancient temple dedicated to Sri Venkataramana renowned for its sanctity. The members or trustees of this temple were part of a group called as Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. The trustees and the institution was referred to as the Appellant.In 1915, a suit, OS No. 26 of 1915, was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for framing a scheme for this temple. This decree was passed on 9-3-1921, and it is common ground that the temple has ever since been managed in accordance with the provisions of the scheme contained therein. Apprehending that action might be taken to put the provisions of this Act in operation with reference to the suit temple, the trustees sent a memorial to the Government of Madras claiming that it was a private temple belonging exclusively to the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, and it did not fall within the purview of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act. Further, the trustees filed the suit (out of which the present appeal arises) for a declaration that the Sri Venkataramana temple at Moolky was not a temple as defined in Section 2(2) of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act. It was alleged in the plaint that the temple was founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins in Moolky Petah, it had been under their management at all times and they were the followers of the Kashi Mutt.it was also alleged that it was the head of the Mutt that performed various religious ceremonies in the temple, and that the other communities had no rights to worship therein.

ISSUE

There were two kinds of issues raised before this Hon'ble court i.e. Primary issue and Secondary issue. The Primary or the main issue that this Hon'ble court dealt with stated that whether the right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion guaranteed under Article 26(b) of the Constitution is subject to, and can be controlled by, a law protected by Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, throwing open a Hindu public temple to all classes and Sections of Hindus. The Secondary issues were (1) Whether the Sri Venkataramana Temple was defined in Section 2(2) of Madras Act and if yes, was it a denominational temple (2) If the temple was denominational in nature, were the plaintiffs entitled to exclude all the hindus except Gowda Saraswath Brahmins on the ground of Article 26(b) of the Constitution.

RULES

Article 25(2)(b) of the Indian Constitution states that “Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law- providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and Sections of Hindus” Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution states that “Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any Section thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion”

The Preamble of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act states that the policy of the Provincial Government was “to remove the disabilities imposed by custom or usage on certain classes of Hindus against entry into Hindu temples in the Province which are open to the general Hindu public”. Further,  Section 2(2) of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act mentions the definition of “temple”. It states that it is  “a place by whatever name known, which is dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindu community in general as a place of public religious worship”

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

1. This Hon'ble court discussed the secondary issues before discussing the primary one, to ensure its better understanding. In the first secondary issue, it  examined that there was no environment that the temple in question was a private one. When the suit was instituted, the then definition of temple as mentioned in Section 2(2) of the act only included institutions which were dedicated to or for the benefit of the Hindu public in general declaring the institution in question as that of not a temple character. However, post the amendment of 1949, it also included dedicated to or for the benefit of a Section of the public declaring the institution a temple but not a private one. The court also examined that the inception of the temple was founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. It considered the Brahmins not as a Section of community but as a sect associated with the foundation and maintenance of the Sri Venkataramana Temple and regarded them as religious denominators. Simply because other classes of Hindus were also admitted freely into the temple when it was solely for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins held no negative aspect in the decision of this Hon'ble court and it decided this question in the affirmative station that the temple was denominational in nature.
2. Next the court discussed the second issue in the set of secondary issues. It was argued by the learned Solicitor-General that exclusion of persons from entering into a temple cannot ipso facto be regarded as a matter of religion. This Hon'ble court relied on the judgement The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt for the phrase “matters of religion”  wherein it was held that it embraced not merely matters of doctrine and belief pertaining to the religion but also the practice of it. Therefore, the court regarded that matters of religion in Article 26(b) also included practices which were regarded by the community as part of its religion. After successfully examining whether the practices regarded by the community as part of religion were included under “matters of religion”, the court further held that the above practice was valid under article 26(b). The said article successfully included the right to exclude persons who are not entitled to participate in the worship according to the tenets of the institution. The temple was allowed to exclude the people except Gowda Saraswath Brahmins to enter and worship the temple.
3. Now once the secondary issues were successfully discussed by this Hon'ble court, it began examining the primary issue. It said that a temple is open and accessible to the public. The term “public” refers to that of any Section of the society. The interpretation of the two articles therefore showed considerable conflict with each other. It was initially declared by this court that normally, it was impossible to read any limitation in the language of article 25(2)(b). The language of the article was plain and unambiguous and it wasn’t open to any limitations that weren't there.
4. This showed that there were two provisions of equal authority having an apparent conflict with each other. The court observed that to resolve the conflict between the two provisions, the rule of construction should be applied that states that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect could be given to both. This was known as the Harmonious Construction. The court also examined that the evidence of PW1 remained uncontradicted and wasn’t challenged before the honble court. It was also stated as in the referred judgement Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt that as the temple was a denominational one, the modifications made in the High Court decree would be within the protection of Article 26(b).
5. It was therefore held by this Hon'ble court that even though the right protected by Article 25(2)(b) should be construed liberally in favour of the public, it does not follow that the right is absolute and unlimited in character. Thus, the right recognised by Article 25(2)(b) must necessarily be subject to some limitations or regulations, and one such limitation or regulation must arise in the process of harmonising the right conferred by Article 25(2)(b) with that protected by Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution.

RELEVANT THEORY

The basis of the principle of harmonious construction is that the legislature never intends to contradict itself by providing two repugnant provisions in the same statute. The Act has to be read as a whole and its provisions have to be harmonised giving effect to all of them. The rule of harmonious construction says that when two or more provisions of the same statute are repugnant, the Court tries to construe these provisions in such a manner, as to give effect to both by harmonising them with each other. The court may do so either by holding two or more apparently conflicting provisions as dealing with separate situations or by holding that one provision merely provides for an exception of the general rule contained therein. The court had an endeavour to always adopt the harmonious construction. It was examined that the entire statute must be first read as a whole, then Section by Section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word, and the relevant provisions must be read harmoniously.

Harmonious constr