REV. STAINISLAUS V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(1977) 1 SCC 677: AIR 1977 SC 908
FACTS
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Baloda-Bazar sanctioned the prosecution of Rev. Stainislaus for the commission of offence under Sections 3, 4 and 5(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act. When the case came up before Magistrate, First class, Baloda-Bazar, the Appellant raised a preliminary objection that the State Legislature did not have the necessary legislative competence and the Madhya Pradesh Act was ultra vires the Constitution as it did not fall within the purview of Entry 1 of List II and Entry 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule.
The controversy in the Madhya Pradesh cases relates to the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya Adhiniyam, 1968. The controversy in the Orissa cases arises out of the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967.
ISSUE
The issue pertaining to the current scenario was whether the two Acts were violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25(1) of the Constitution, and whether the State Legislatures were competent to enact them?
RULE
Article 25(1) of the Indian Constitution states that “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.”
JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
- The Appellant contended that the right to ‘propagate’ one’s religion means the right to convert a person to one’s own religion. This Hon'ble court examined that the word “propagate” has multiple meanings. It has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary to mean “to spread from person to person, or from place to place, to disseminate, diffuse (a statement, belief, practice, etc.)”. According to the Century Dictionary, it means “to transmit or spread from person to person or from place to place; carry forward or onward; diffuse; extend; as to propagate a report; to propagate the Christian religion.”
- The court observed that “propagate” was used in the sense wherein it grants the right to transmit or spread one's own religion and not a right to convert someone to one's own religion. The article “freedom of conscience” to every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in turn postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion otherwise it would impinge on the “freedom of conscience”.
- The meaning of “Guarantee” mentioned under article 25(1) was considered in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay wherein it was stated that subject to the restrictions mentioned in this article, every person had a fundamental right to entertain such religious belief as may be approved of by his judgement or conscience and also to exhibit his belief and ideas in such overt acts as sanctioned by his religion and also to propagate his religious views for the edification of others. This Hon'ble court agreed with the above judgement and stated that freedom of religion enshrined in the article is not guaranteed in respect of one religion only, but covers all religions alike, and it can be properly enjoyed by a person if he exercises his right in a manner commensurate with the like freedom of persons following the other religions.
- This Hon'ble court further discussed the meanings of the expression “allurement” and “fraud” as defined by Section 3 of Madhya Pradesh Act. It clearly prohibits conversion by use of force or by allurement or by fraudulent means and Section 4 penalises such forcible conversion. Similarly Section 3 of the Orissa Act prohibits forcible conversion by the use of force or by inducement or by any fraudulent means, and Section 4 penalises such forcible conversion. The Acts therefore clearly provide for the maintenance of public order.
- The expression “public order” is a wide connotation and therefore the court accepted the viewpoint mentioned in Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras. It stated that “public order” has a wide connotation and signifies the state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established.
- It was concluded by this Hon'ble court that the article contemplated that restrictions may be imposed on the rights guaranteed by them in the interests of public order. If an attempt was made to raise communal passions, e.g. on the ground that someone has been “forcibly” converted to another religion, it would, in all probability, give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public order, affecting the community at large. Therefore such acts fall within the purview of Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule as they are meant to avoid disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversion from one religion to another in a manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community. They do not provide for the regulation of religion hence dont fall under Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.
RELEVANT THEORY
- Purposive Construction discusses the importance of the purport and object of the act. It also states that a statute must be read in its entirety and purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect by applying principles of purposive construction. A purposive construction promoting the object of the enactment but not extending its sweep beyond the frontiers within which it was intended to operate must be adopted keeping in view that a construction which exempts a person from its operation must be preferred to the one which includes him in it, in view of the penal nature of the statue. It is normally based on three components namely, language, purpose and discretion. It is the duty of the courts to accept a construction which promotes the object of the legislation and also prevents its possible abuse even though the mere possibility of abuse of a provision does not affect its Constitutionality or construction. Abuse has to be checked by constant vigilance and monitoring of individual cases and this can be done by screening of the cases by suitable machinery at a high level. Further, Purposive construction can only be resorted to when language of a provision is capable of more than one interpretation. Where literal construction or plain meaning may cause hardship, futility, absurdity or uncertainty, the purposive or contextual construction may be preferred to arrive at a more just, reasonable and sensible result.