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G.NARAYANASWAMI V. G. PANNERSELVAM (1972) 3 SCC 717

  

 

  1. G.NARAYANASWAMI V. G. PANNERSELVAM

(1972) 3 SCC 717

FACTS

The Appellant’s election was held on 11th April, 1970 to the Madras Legislative Council from the Madras District Graduates’ Constituency was set aside by a learned Judge of the Madras High Court who decided all issues except one in favour of the Appellant. Hence, the Appellant filed an appeal under Section 116-A of the Representation of People Act, 1951.

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current scenario is if the Respondent was not qualified to stand for election to the Graduates’ Constituency on all or any of the grounds set out by the Petitioner in Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the election Petition.

RULE

There are multiple Sections referenced in the current case. Article 168 of our Constitution shows that the State Legislatures in nine States in India, including Madras, were to consist of two Houses: the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. Article 170 lays down that the Legislative Assembly of each State ‘shall consist of members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the State, in such manner as the Parliament may by law determine. Section 5 of the Representation of People Act, 43 of 1951 discusses the qualifications for membership of a Legislative Assembly. Section 6 discusses the qualifications for membership of a Legislative council. Section 16 lays down the qualifications of an elector negatively by prescribing who shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral roll.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

  1. The court observed that the rule of literal interpretation as described in Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes as “the primary rule” cannot be abandoned today in interpreting any document. Lord Evershed stated “The length and detail of modern legislation has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule”. The court further reinforced that it is the elementary and basic rule of interpretation and that the construction process allows one to get a real sense and meaning. Other methods of construction should only be extracted if the language used is contradictory, ambiguous etc. therefore, it is imperative to have an examination performed before applying any method of construction at all.
  2. Sutherland’s “Statutory Construction” and Crawford’s “Construction of Statutes” discussed that where the statute’s meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. If they should be interpolated, the statute would more than likely fail to express the legislative intent, as the thought intended to be conveyed might be altered by the addition of new words. Further, even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute.
  3. It was observed by the court that the term “electorate”, used in Article 171(3), (a), (b) and (c) hasn’t been defined by the Constitution nor by any enactment of a parliament. However, the word was defined by Section 2(1) (a) of the Representation of People Act.
  4. The court examined that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term electorate used in Article 171(3), (a), (b) and (c) is the body of persons who elect. Whatever may have been the opinion of the Constitution makers, it is not possible to say on the perusal of article 171 that the Second Chambers were meant to incorporate the principle of vocational or functional representation. Further, it was acceptable to look for the legislative intention in materials outside the four corners of a statute where its language was ambiguous or conflicting.
  5. The court further observed that the language and the legislative history of the Articles 171 and 173 of the Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 enabled them to presume a deliberate omission of the qualification that the representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate. No absurdity resulted if such a presumption was intended. However, this Hon'ble court decided not to infer in similarity to the learned Judge of the Madras High Court as an addition of such a condition to be necessary or implied belonged to the domain of the legislation and the learned judge invaded the legislation’s sphere. Such a defect could only be removed by the law made by the Parliament. Further, the court also examined that the decision of the High Court contravened the rule of plain meaning and literal interpretation, which must prevail.
  6. Hence, this Hon'ble court concluded that the High Court erroneously travelled outside the four corners of the statute when there was no ambiguity at all in its language and by resorting to a presumed legislative intent added such an additional qualification to those expressly laid down by the Constitution and by the statute. The appeal was allowed, judgement and order of the Madras High Court was set aside and the Respondent’s election petition was dismissed.

RELEVANT THEORY

The Golden Rule is a rule wherein the words of a statute must be given their ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of the words should not be departed from unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning. It is a rule considered as the modified principle of the grammatical interpretation. As observed in the Sussex Peerage “The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to explain the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such cases, best declare the intention of the law-giver.” Parke J. observed in Becke v Smith that “If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgement, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the function of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning.” Further it was observed that the term “Golden Rule” was adopted in Grey v Pearson.