B.N. MUTTO V. T.K. NANDI (1979) 1 SCC 361

B.N. MUTTO V. T.K. NANDI (DR)

(1979) 1 SCC 361

FACTS

The Appellant- Landlord was served with a notice to quit government premises on 9th December, 1975, though he had already retired on 30th November, 1975. He sought eviction of the tenant.

ISSUE

Whether the Rent Controller was right in refusing leave to the Respondent to defend the eviction petition filed by the landlord.

RULE

Section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act- This Section “confers on a landlord who owns a residential accommodation in his own name or in the name of his wife, or dependent child in the Union territory of Delhi and was in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority and is required by any general or special order made by the Government or the authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in Delhi either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, a right shall accrue to such landlord to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him.”

DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT

It allowed a revision of the Respondent-tenant and set aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Delhi, rejecting the application of the Respondent seeking permission to contest the proceedings for eviction filed by the Appellants under Section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

1. This Hon'ble court held that it wasn’t clear as to why the right to recover immediate possession is not confined to Government servants alone under Section 14A. It was clearly mentioned that according to the Government's policy statement, the intention was only to require the Government servants to vacate the premises allotted to them by the Government if they had their own houses in the area. It cannot be said that it was by inadvertence that the Legislature mentioned persons instead of Government servants and made the Section applicable to persons other than Government servants. It was stated at the Bar that Government accommodation was provided not only to Government servants but also to Members of Parliament and other non-officials who occupy important positions in public life.
2. The court further observed that the rule of construction of the statutes was clearly laid down in Craies on Statute Law relying on Tasmania v. Commonwealth. It held that the cardinal rule for the constructions of acts of Parliament should be construed according to the intention expressed in the acts themselves. The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words alone best declare the intention of the lawgiver.
3. It was further observed that according to the object of the act, a plain meaning to the word “person”. It wasn't confined to the Government Servants and the accommodation could also be provided to others also. The court saw no reason not to give its plain and unambiguous meaning to the Section. The retired Government servants as well as others who are in occupation of Government accommodation may become entitled to a special advantage, but the object of the act was to enable the government to get possession of accommodation by allowing the allottees to get immediate possession owned but let by them.
4. Hence, it was concluded by this court that it didn't accept the decision taken by the Hon'ble High Court and also held that the landlord who retired before the date on which the notice to quit was given by the Government is also entitled to the benefits of Section 14A.  

RELEVANT THEORY

The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first principle of interpretation. According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning if it is clear and unambiguous. Where wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, the rule of literal construction is  applied and recourse to other principles of interpretation is not required. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or they suggest a contrary meaning. Where the meaning of a word or expression is not clear, the literal rule of interpretation is not applicable. Ordinarily, courts should not depart from literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible. Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of interpretation may be applied.