LALITA KUMARI V. GOVT. OF U.P. & ORS.(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524

LALITA KUMARI V. GOVT. OF U.P. & ORS.

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524

FACTS

The present writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, was filed by Lalita Kumari (minor) through her father, viz. Shri Bhola Kamat for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus or direction(s) of like nature against the Respondents for the protection of his minor daughter who had been kidnapped. The grievance in the said writ petition was that on 11.05.2008, a written report was submitted by the Petitioner before the officer in-charge of the police station concerned who did not take any action on the same. Thereafter, when the Superintendent of Police was moved, an FIR was registered.

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the present case is whether the police officer is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR) upon receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  or the police officer has the power to conduct a “preliminary inquiry” to test the veracity of such information before registering the same.

 

DECISION OF A TWO JUDGE BENCH

They issued a notice to the Union of India, the Chief Secretaries of all the States and Union Territories and Director Generals of Police/Commissioners of Police stating that if the required steps aren’t taken for registration of FIRs immediately and the copies are not handed over to the complainants, they may move the Magistrates concerned by filing complaint petitions for appropriate directions to the police to register the case immediately and for apprehending the accused persons, failing which, contempt proceedings must be initiated against such delinquent police officers if no sufficient cause is shown.

DECISION OF A THREE JUDGE BENCH

Here, the court referred the said matter to a Constitution bench

INTERPRETATION OF Section 154 OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1. It was observed that the basic principle of interpretation of a statute is the literal interpretation. In the case of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, its language employed is the determinant factor of its legislative intent. Section 154(1) shows that any information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station shall be reduced into writing by him or under his direction. There is no ambiguity in the language of Section 154(1) of the Code.
2. It was examined in M/s Hiralal Rattanlal (supra) that the basic rule of construction for a statutory provision is the literal construction. If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, the aid of other rules of construction isn't needed. Further, it was also observed in B. Premanand (supra) that the other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Hence, after referencing the above cases, it was observed that Section 154(1) admits only the literal construction.
3. Further it was observed that the use of the word “shall” in Section 154(1) of the Code clearly shows the legislative intent that it is mandatory to register an FIR if the information given to the police discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. It was observed in Khub Chand (supra) that the term “shall” in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to that term unless it leads to some kind of an absurdity.
4. The object of using “shall '' in Section 154(1) was to ensure that all the information related to the cognizable offences was registered by the police and investigated in accordance with the provisions of law.
5. Hence, it was observed by the court that the use of “shall” coupled with the scheme of the Act concluded that the legislators intended that if an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence is given, it would mandatorily be registered by the officer-in- charge of the police station. Section 154 of the Code should be strictly construed and the word ‘shall’ should be given its natural meaning. The golden rule of interpretation can be given a go-by only in cases where the language of the Section is ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

The supreme court observed that the imperativeness of recording an FIR is not affected by Section 166A of the Indian Penal Code. The use of the word “Shall'' leaves no discretion for the police officials to hold any preliminary enquiry before recording an FIR. Use of the word “information” also denotes that he has to record the information irrespective of its credibility. Registration of the FIR before conducting investigation is procedure established by law and it doesn't offend Article 21 and also doesn't lead to any arbitrary arrest. Inquiry under Section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to a judicial act. “Preliminary inquiry” and “inquiry” under Section 159 relates to a judicial exercise by court and not by the police. Thus, registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

RELEVANT THEORY

The rule of literal construction is considered to be the first principle of interpretation. According to this rule, the words of an enactment are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning if it is clear and unambiguous. Where wordings of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, the rule of literal construction is  applied and recourse to other principles of interpretation is not required. Unless the law is logically defective and suffers from conceptual and inherent ambiguity, it should be given its literal meaning. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or they suggest a contrary meaning. Where the meaning of a word or expression is not clear, the literal rule of interpretation is not applicable. Ordinarily, courts should not depart from literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible. Only when literal construction results in some absurdity or anomaly, other principles of interpretation may be applied.