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BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS V. STATE OF M.P. AIR 1955 SC 781

BHIKAJI NARAIN DHAKRAS V. STATE OF M.P. AIR 1955 SC 781

 

FACTS

The petitioners were carrying on their business as stage carriage operators for a considerable number of years under permits granted under Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947. Multiple amendments were introduced by the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 into the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in its application to Central Provinces and Berar. The current judgement aimed to dispose off all the five petitions which were heard together.

 

ISSUE

The issue pertaining to the current case discussed the Constitutional validity of the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947.

 

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

  1. This Hon'ble court discussed the Doctrine of Eclipse in its judgement. It was observed that the  doctrine was officially created in this case. It stated that the portion of the state law repugnant to the central law isn’t dead. It doesn’t become ultra vires in whole or in part. It is eclipsed and if the central law were to be repealed at any time, it would again become operative.
  2. It was observed that the act was amended before the Fundamental Rights were introduced. The act possessed multiple amended provisions which conferred extensive powers over the provincial government. For instance, the government was in a liberty to (i) cancel any permit after the expiry of three months from the date of notification declaring its intention to do so and on payment of such compensation as might be provided by the Rules (ii) fix fares or freights throughout the Province or for any area or for any route. (iii) limit the period of the licence to a period less than the minimum specified in the Act etc. however, once the Fundamental Rights were introduced after the inception of the Constitution in 1950, it guaranteed the citizens Right To Freedom under all the seven heads. Such rights were protected under Article 13.
  3. The amending act was already in operation at the inception of the Constitution. The new provisions introduced by the Act authorised the Provincial Government to exclude all private motor transport operators from the field of transport business. Hence, it was an infraction of the provisions of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and would be void under Article 13(1), unless it could be justified as a part of the limitations rightfully mentioned under Article 19(6).
  4. The court observed that in Shagir Ahmad v. The State of U.P, if the word “restriction” was read in the sense of limitation and not extinction then clearly the law there under review which, like the amending Act now before us, sanctioned the imposition of total prohibition on the right to carry on the business of a motor transport operator could not be justified under Article 19(6). Further, if the word “restriction” in clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution, as in other clauses of that Article, were to be taken in certain circumstances to include prohibition as well, even then the impugned law could not be justified as reasonable. Hence, the amending act was inconsistent with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 19(6) and therefore became void “to the extent of such inconsistency” as per the Article 13 (1).
  5. The court further observed that there was no need to discuss the meaning of the word “void” as the matter stood concluded by a majority decision in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay. According to its ratio decidendi, the impugned act was an existing law when the Constitution came into force. The restrictions given in the said act couldn’t be justified as per Article 19(6) and therefore it became void to the extent of such consistency as per Article 13(1). It was further mentioned that the entire act didn’t become void, but only “to the extent of such inconsistency”, that is to say, to the extent it became inconsistent with the provisions of Part III which conferred the fundamental rights on the citizens. The act wasn’t independently void.
  6. Hence, the petitions were filed exactly a month after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 came into force, and, on a parity of reasoning hereinbefore mentioned, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the Constitutionality of the impugned Act on and from the 27-4-1955.