This Hon'ble court observed that if the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the right to disseminate information, to a wide range of population, the access which enables the right to be exercised is also an integral part of the right. The wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict the content of the right, nor can it justify its denial.
The court observed that where no reasonable standards are laid down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence and where no clear standard is given to either law abiding citizens or authorities and a Section which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary and unreasonable. Ordinary people must be able to understand what is prohibited and permitted. Further, those who administer the law must be aware of it so that arbitrary and vague practices of law aren't condoned. Here, a Penal law restricting freedom of speech and expression is liable to be struck down for vagueness and not providing manageable standards. Since Section 66A of the IT act, 2000 displayed arbitrariness, it was held to be unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness and providing unmanageable standards.
Finally this Hon'ble court held in the current case that any law seeking to impose a restriction on the freedom of speech can only pass muster if it is approximately related to any of the eight subject matters set out in Article 19(2).' In this case the court invalidated Section 66-A, Information Technology Act, 2000, an Act to regulate electronic communica-tion, on grounds of not being covered by any of the eight grounds on which freedom of speech may be restricted. The Section provided severe punishment among others for any electronic mail or message that caused annoyance and inconvenience to or misled the addressee. The court found the Section having a chilling effect on freedom of speech and expression by its overbreadth and vagueness. The same legal propositions have also been confirmed in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India'.