STATE OF RAJASTHAN V. G. CHAWLA AIR 1959 SC 544
FACTS
The Ajmer Legislative Assembly passed the Ajmer (Sound Amplifiers Control) Act, 1952 (Ajmer III of 1953), which received the President's assent on 9-3-1953. The Act was challenged successfully by the respondents before the learned Judicial Commissioner, who ruled that it exceeded the powers granted to the State Legislature under Section 21 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (49 of 1951), rendering it ultra vires.
According to these provisions, the State Legislature's authority was limited to the two lists excluding the Union list. If the subject matter of the Act substantially fell under an Entry in the Union list, it would be deemed unconstitutional. However, if it predominantly pertained to the other two lists, there would be no prima facie conflict with a Central statute or an "occupied field". The contested entries considered by the Judicial Commissioner were as follows:
- Entry No. 31 of the Union List: Post and Telegraphs; Telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms of communication.
- Entry No. 6 of the State List: Public health and sanitation, hospitals, and dispensaries.
It appears that the learned Judicial Commissioner did not take into account entry No. 1 of the State List, which pertains to public order (excluding the use of naval, military, or air forces of the Union in aid of civil power). Shri H.J. Umrigar relied on the last Entry, either independently or in conjunction with entry No. 6 of the State List, and we believe he was justified in doing so.
ISSUES:
The issue at hand concerns the regulation of loudspeakers powered by amplifiers, which has become a growing nuisance. The question is whether this regulatory measure falls within the scope of entries in the State List. It is acknowledged that amplifiers serve as instruments for broadcasting and communication, falling under Entry 31 of the Union list.
JUDGEMENT-
The power to legislate regarding public health inherently encompasses the authority to regulate the use of amplifiers when they produce disruptive loud noises due to a user's disregard for the comfort and well-being of others, thereby constituting a clear nuisance.
It is not a valid argument to contend that the Act's essence aligns with Entry 31 of the Union list just because other loud noises from various sources are controlled and prohibited. The core of the contested Act is the regulation of amplifier use in the interest of health and tranquillity, and thus, it predominantly (if not entirely) falls within the powers delegated to preserve, regulate, and promote these aspects.
It does not infringe upon the domain of Entry 31, even though the apparatus in question, regulated and controlled by the Act, is used for broadcasting or communication. Considering the Act in its entirety, it is evident that its essence aligns with the powers granted by Entry No. 6, and possibly Entry No. 1, of the State List. The Act does not purport to encroach upon the sphere of Entry No. 31, even though it incidentally touches upon a subject provided therein. The Act's ultimate aim and purpose establish its connection with the State List.
No legislation under Entry No. 31 of the Union list, burdening the ownership and possession of amplifiers with such regulation or control, was brought to our attention. With no question of conflict or an occupied field, we have no hesitation in affirming that the Act is fully within the ambit of the first-cited entry and conceivably other entries in the State List.