D.C. WADHWA V. STATE OF BIHAR (1987) 1 SCC 378

 D.C. WADHWA V. STATE OF BIHAR (1987) 1 SCC 378

 

FACTS

In this case, Dr. D.C. Wadhwa who was the petitioner, was a professor of Economics based in Pune. He filed a PIL questioning the power of the Governor to re-promulgate several ordinances done by the governor of Bihar. For this, the petitioner did extensive research and even made publications highlighting the misuse of the ordinance-making power of the governor by the governor of Bihar where the government of Bihar had promulgated a total of 256 ordinances between the years 1967 and 1981, and all of these 256 ordinances were alive for periods varying from one year to fourteen years, out of these 256 ordinances, 69 of these were re-promulgated several times due to mechanical re-promulgation of these ordinances without altering the ordinance itself or making an effort to converting it into an Act. The court looked into the Governor's overall authority to repeatedly reissue ordinances, as some ordinances had been reissued more than thirty times. The specific focus was on three ordinances that had been in effect for 10 to 14 years. The central question in dispute was whether the Governor could routinely extend the re-issuance of ordinances indefinitely, potentially assuming the legislative power vested in the Governor under Constitution Article 213, thus bypassing the role of the legislature in the process.

 

ISSUES:

The case's significance in constitutional law arises from the executive's endeavor to assume legislative authority through the repeated re-issuance of ordinances. This conduct by the executive branch contravenes constitutional provisions, as every citizen is entitled to be governed by laws established in compliance with the Constitution, specifically by the legislature, rather than by regulations generated by the executive.

 

APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS:

According to the appellants, who were primarily represented by Adv. Soli J. Sorabji, the following claims were made:

(i) Under the provision of Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance, 1983, the State was given full monopoly over the regulation of acquiring and selling the forest produce, which is in contravention of the policies of the constitutional mandate.

(ii) Under Clause (7) of the ordinance, the state government or any designated forest official authorized by the state government has the authority to set the price at which forest produce can be purchased and sold.

(iii) The cost of producing, transporting, disposing of, and using bricks is carefully considered.

 

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS:

  1. The respondents claim that: (i) The provisions of the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulations of Trade) Third Ordinance, 1983, and the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance, 1983 have expired and were passed by the parliament to enact them as legislation, depriving the petitioners of locus standing to file a writ petition in a court of law. The respondents were represented by attorney L.N. Sinha. The third ordinance, known as the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance, has already been submitted as a legislative proposal to the legislature.
  2. Petitioner No. 1 lacks any legal standing to contest the issue since he is viewed as an outsider who is not permitted to do so.

 

JUDGMENT-

The Bihar government believed that the executive authority was sufficient to issue the ordinances whenever appropriate and that the state legislature's approval of the ordinance was not required. The Indian Constitution's guiding principles might be clearly violated by this. In light of this, the Supreme Court decided in the current case that the government's practice of repeatedly promulgating laws in an effort to show that it was exercising its legislative authority lawfully cannot be excused. The Supreme Court invalidated this unreasonable use of the ordinance-making authority because it was a "colorable exercise of power" and a "subversion of the democratic process." Re-promulgating an ordinance could be illegal, a violation of the Constitution, and a betrayal of democratic principles. Ordinances aren't exempt from judicial examination, and the Court has the authority to nullify an ordinance if it's disingenuously announced. The authority to publish an ought should be used only in extraordinary emergency situations and not to satisfy anyone's political desires. The executive is not permitted to carry out the legislative duty that belongs to the legislature. When the court states that there may be circumstances in which the parliament is unable to repeal the proclaimed ordinances, the judgment rendered by Bhagwati, J. disintegrates.