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MAHANT RAM DAS V. GANGA DAS AIR 1961 SC 882 (M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.)

MAHANT RAM DAS V. GANGA DAS AIR 1961 SC 882 (M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.)

 

FACTS

  • The appellant in a title suit sought a declaration that he was nominated the Mahant of a Sangat by his Guru by a registered deed and thus had the right to manage the Sangat.
  • The trial judge dismissed the suit and on appeal, the division bench of the HC allowed it on condition that the appellant pay the deficient court fees of ₹2000 within a specified time, failure of which will dismiss the appeal.
  • However, the appellant being not able to find money, sought a time extension before the vacation bench but no division bench was sitting.
  • The appellant filed an application on 08/07/1954 requesting that he be allowed to pay ₹1,400 immediately and the balance within a month. HC on 13/07/1954 dismissed the application since the payment was not done within time.
  • The appellant then filed a s.151 application which was rejected by another division bench which opined that the proper remedy was a review petition.
  • Accordingly, the appellant filed an application u/s.151 read with Order 47 Rule 1 explaining his inability to find money, that he was seriously ill and upon slumping of the grain market, he was unable to secure a loan. HC held that the application did not fall within the Order 47 and Ss. 148, 149, and 151 of the CPC only applied to cases which were not disposed of and that time could be extended only before the final order was passed.
  • However, another division bench of the HC granted the certificate to appeal.

 

ISSUE

  • Whether HC could enlarge time even when it had finally fixed the payment period?

 

HELD

The 13/07/1954 and subsequent orders were set aside and SC did not send the case back for trial, to avoid a prolonged delay. It was satisfied that sufficient ground had been made out for time extension. Consequently, SC granted two months for the said payment.

  • The application for a time extension was made “before the deadline actually ran out”. This application was not considered at all because the period set in the peremptory (final) order by the division bench in appeal had expired.
  • 148 allows extension of time even if the original period expires and S. 149 is equally liberal. So, these sections could be invoked even when the time had “not actually expired”.
  • Additionally, during vacation, a division bench was not sitting, should have been considered. So, the order though passed after the expiry of the fixed time by the original judgment, would have operated from 08/07/1954.
  • The orders putting deadlines are meant to prompt obedience and avoid delay. They do not estop courts from considering events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed.
  • HC could have exercised its power on 13/07/1954 when the petition was filed within the deadline. Additionally, it could have also done the same when two petitions were filed u/s 151 while exercising its inherent powers. If HC had felt inclined to take action on any of these options, they were amply empowered to do justice u/Ss. 148 & 149.
  • HC was in error on both occasions. It should have extended time on 13/07/1954 if sufficient cause was made out.
  • No costs were imposed as the appeal was heard ex-parte (respondents did not appear to contest).

 

COMMENTARY

A request for extension of time to deposit deficit Court-fees if rejected by the Court, then it would be incorrect on facts. The Court can extend the time if an application therefore is presented to the Court within the period given, and that in such a case even if the order is made after the expiry of that period, that will relate back to the date of the application, and the extension will be valid. If the amount of costs is paid within the time fixed or extended by the Court then the suit should be deemed to have been instituted validly on the date on which it was presented.

An order was made in appeal that the plaintiff should pay additional court fees, both on the plaint and on this memorandum of appeal, within three months and that in default, the suit should stand dismissed. The plaintiff applied within time, for extension of time for payment, but the period had expired when the petition actually came up for hearing. The High Court dismissed it on the ground that the order had worked itself out and that the court had no power to extend the time. In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court held that s.148 applied and that the order, though made after the expiry of the period, would relate back to the date of petition, and so extension could be granted. The decision is not, it is submitted, an authority for the position that an application for extension could be made after the expiry of the period. It only decides that if an application is made within time, extension could be granted, even though at the time of the order, the period had expired.