A.K. KRAIPAK V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1970 SC 150.

A.K. KRAIPAK V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1970 SC 150.

“The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated.”

 

FACTS

One Naqishbund was a candidate for selection to the Indian Foreign Service and was also a member of the Selection Board. He did not sit on the Board when his own name was considered.  Naqishbund was recommended by the Board and he was selected by the Public Service Commission. The candidates who were not selected filed a writ petition for quashing the selection of Naqishbund on the ground that the principles of natural justice were violated. 

 

ISSUE

Whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings?

 

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS

1. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that power conferred on the selection board under Rule 4 read with Regulation was a non-judicial power whereas the case for the contesting respondents was that it was purely an administrative power. In support of the contention that the power in question was a part-judicial power, emphasis was laid on the language of Rule 4 as well as Regulation 5 which prescribe that the selections should be made after adjudging the suitability of the officers belonging to the State service. 
2. It was contended that such a power is essentially a judicial power and the same had to be exercised in accordance with the well accepted rules relating to the exercise of such a power. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that the power in question was exercised by a statutory body and a wrong exercise of that power is likely to adversely affect the careers of the officers not selected.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

1. It was contended by the learned Attorney-General that though the selection board was a statutory body, it was not required to decide about any right, the proceedings before it cannot be considered quasi-judicial; its duty was merely to select officers who in its opinion were suitable for being absorbed in the Indian Forest Service. According to him the word -adjudge’ in Rule 4 as well as Regulation 5 means “found worthy of selection”.
2. The learned Attorney-General urged that even if we are to hold that Naqishbund should not have participated-in the deliberations of the selection board while it considered the suitability of Basu, Baig and Kaul, there is no ground to set aside the selection of other officers. According to him it will be sufficient in the interest of justice if we direct that the cases of Basu, Baig and Kaul be reconsidered by a Board of which Naqishbund is not a member. Proceeding further he urged that under any circumstance, no case is made out for disturbing the selection of the officers in the junior scale. 
3. It was next urged by the learned Attorney-General that the mere fact that one of the members of the Board was biased against some of the petitioners cannot vitiate the entire proceedings

 

RATIONALE

1. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In the past it was thought that law of natural justice included just two rules namely: 

(1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and 

(2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). 

Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably

2. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power, one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. 
3. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of nonjudicial power has undergone a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.  
4. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis.
5. Naqishbund was a party to the preparation of the select list in order of preference and that he is shown as No. 1 in the list. To that extent he was undoubtedly a judge in his own case, a circumstance which is abhorrent to our concept of justice. Now coming to the selection of the officers in the junior scale service, the selections to both the senior scale service as well as junior scale service were made from the same pool. Every officer who had put in service of 8 years or more, even if he was holding the post of an Assistant Conservator of Forests was eligible for being selected for the senior scale service. In fact some Assistant Conservators have been selected for the senior scale service. At the same time some of the officers who had put in more than eight years of service had been selected for the junior scale service. Hence it is not possible to separate the two sets of officers.

 

HELD

Quashing the selection, the court observed: It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased.”

Speaking for the Supreme Court, Hegde J propounded: The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it.

These petitions were allowed and the impugned selections were set aside. 

 

COMMENTARY

The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of quasi-judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years, the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.” - Lectures On Administrative Law

 

More often than not, it is not easy to distinguish an administrative decision from a quasi-judicial one. Nevertheless, the aim of both, a quasi-judicial as well as an administrative function, is to arrive at a just decision. The thin line dividing an administrative power and a quasi judicial one being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative or a quasi-judicial one, regard must be had to: (i) the nature of the power conferred; (ii) the person or persons on whom it is conferred; (iii) the framework of the law conferring that power; (iv) the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power; and (v) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised.- M P Jain & S N Jain: Principles of Administrative Law

 

Bhagwati J (as he then was) said: ‘A.K. Kraipak is a landmark in the development of administrative law and it has contributed to a large measure of strengthening the rule of law in this country. We would not like to whittle down in the slightest measure the vital principle laid down in this decision which has nourished the rule of law and injected justice and fair play into legality.’