MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA (1978) 1 SCC 248

 MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA (1978) 1 SCC 248

 

FACTS

1. On July 4, 1977, Maneka Gandhi (herein after referred to as the “Petitioner”), who was a known journalist was intimated through a letter from the regional passport office, Delhi that the Government of India has decided to impound her passport under section 10(3) of the Passport Act, 1967 on the ground of ‘public interest’, mandating her to surrender her passport within seven days from the receipt of the said letter.
2. When the Petitioner requested the regional passport officer to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the above order, a reply was sent by the Government of India stating that the Government has decided to not furnish her a copy of the statement of reasons “in the interest of the general public” section 10(5) of the Passport Act.
3. The Petitioner thereafter, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 against the arbitrary action of the Government of impounding her passport without stating necessary reasons for such action, violating her fundamental rights under Article 21, Article 14, Article 19 of the Constitution. The Petitioner also contended that the said order is void since no opportunity to be heard was provided to the Petitioner before impounding her passport.

 

ISSUES

1. What is the scope of the word “procedure established by law”, law herein being the Passport Act, 1967?

2. Whether there exists a nexus between Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the Right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 contains in itself the right to travel abroad?

4. Whether section 10(3) of the Passport act is violative of Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21?

  

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS

1. The petitioner contended that Section 10(3)(r) is ultra vires Article 21 since it provides for impounding of passport without any procedure as required by that article, or, in any event, even if it could be said that there is some procedure prescribed under the Passports Act, 1967, it is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, not in compliance with the requirement of that article.
2. Secondly, that Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Articles 19(l)(a) and l9(l)(g) inasmuch as it authorises imposition of restrictions on freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a) and freedom to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, or business 216 guaranteed under Article 19(l)(g) and these restrictions are impermissible under Article 19(2) and Article 19(6) respectively.

 

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

The learned Attorney General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, conceded that having regard to the nature of the action involved in the impounding of a passport, the audi alteram partem rule must be held to be excluded, because if notice were to be given to the holder of the passport and reasonable opportunity afforded to him to show cause why his passport should not be impounded, he might immediately, on the strength of the passport, make good his exit from the country and the object of impounding the passport would be frustrated.

 

 

RATIONALE

The court discussed that the doctrine of natural justice consists principally of two rules, namely, nemo debet esse judex in propria causa: no one shall be a judge in his own cause, and audi alteram partem: no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing. The Court confined itself with the second doctrine.

It was held that order made under section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 (power of impounding a passport) could be declared to be bad under clauses 1(a) and (g) of the Article if it was so drastic in nature, as to be imposing unreasonable restrictions on the individual’s freedom covered by the two clauses. Thus if the order of impounding is for an indefinite period it would not be valid under the Article.  

 

HELD

The judgment was delivered by a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court, exponentially expanding the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution. There were seven separate but concurring opinions, while P.N. Bhagwati J. pronounced the majority opinion. The major rulings of the bench have been consolidated in the following points:

1. The expression ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21 of the Constitution shall be interpreted in its widest sense and it covers a variety of rights under its domain which constitutes personal liberty and some of these rights have been granted additional protection under the Constitution as distinct fundamental rights like Article 19.
2. The phrase ‘procedure established by law’ used in Article 21 implies that the procedure shall be reasonable, just and fair and in compliance with the principles of natural justice. This view overruled the meaning of due process held by the majority bench, in the case of A.K. Gopalan v State of Madras. In the present case, the dissenting view of Fazal Ali J. in A.K. Gopalan’s case was employed. Therefore, the court held that the procedure established by law should be reasonable, just and fair and it shall be free from any unreasonableness and arbitrariness, giving effect to the intention of the constitution makers.
3. Overruling the view in A.K. Gopalan’s case that Article 14, 19 and 21, the majority bench of the Court held that the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution are mutually exclusive and interdependent. In this regard, Bhagwati J. observed that, even if a law prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty, that law has to meet the challenge of Article 19 and Article 14 to be held valid in Article 21.
4. The Court held that the freedom of movement is the very essence of the society and the right to travel is one of them. When it is curtailed, all other rights suffer. Krishna Iyer J. stated “Restraints are necessary and validly made by statute, but to paint with an over-board brush, power to blanket-ban travel abroad is to sweep overly and invade illicitly. It is a balancing process, not to over weigh one way or the other.” Therefore, the right to travel abroad was within the ambit of ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21.
5. It was observed that the Passport Act, 1967 did not expressly provide for a requirement of hearing before a passport is impounded but the power of passport authority to impound a passport is a quasi-judicial power and hence, the rules of natural justice definitely apply.

Even if the power is considered as administrative, the principles of natural justice shall follow as this power interferes with the right of the passport holder to travel abroad. So, the court held that the principle of Audi Alteram Partem must be observed by the passport authority.

 However, the majority bench did not hold Section 10(3) of the Passport Act violative of Article 14, Article 19 or Article 21. The writ petition was disposed of without passing any formal order.