Surinder Singh Deswal and Ors. v. Virender Gandhi (2019) 8 SCALE 445
FACTS-
The appellants, partners of M/s. Bhoomi Infrastructure Co., issued several cheques to respondent Virender Gandhi as part payment of retirement dues.
One of the cheques was dishonoured, leading to complaints filed by Gandhi under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
The appellants were convicted by the Judicial Magistrate and sentenced to imprisonment and fine and interim relief of 25% of the amount of compensation was also granted.
Appeal for suspending the sentence, The Additional Session Judge imposed a condition to deposit 25% of the amount of compensation while suspending the sentence.
The HC upheld the order of the Additional Session Judge.
Hence, the present appeal challenging HC order.
The appellant contended that the direction to deposit 25% of the compensation as directed by the trial court could not have been made under Section 148 of the NI Act. Section 148 of the NI Act having come into force on 01.09.2018 could not have been relied by the Courts below. Since the complaint was filed in the year 2015 alleging offense under Section 138 of the NI Act which was much before the enforcement of Section 148 of the NI Act
ISSUE-
Whether Sec 148 of NI ACT,1881 has a retrospective effect or not?
RULE-
The amendment to Sec 148 have retrospective effect as it is applied to an appellate stage, not during the trial.
HELD-
The court noted that the amendment to Section 148 of the NI Act aimed to address delay tactics by allowing interim compensation.
Despite the complaints being filed before the amendment, the court observed that the amendment was in force during the appeal process.
The court interpreted Section 148 liberally to align with the objectives of preventing delay in cheque-related cases.
Although the word "may" is used in Section 148, the court viewed it as a rule rather than an exception, giving the appellate court discretion to order the deposit.
Non-compliance with the suspension condition could lead to the vacation of the suspension, as it undermines the purpose of the amendment.
The court distinguishes between the applicability of Sections 143A and 148 of the NI Act. Section 143A pertains to the trial stage, before the pronouncement of guilt or order of conviction. Section 148 applies at the appellate stage, after the accused is found guilty of the offense under Section 138 of the Act.
Section 143A includes provisions, such as Sub-section (5), which do not have counterparts in Section 148. Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which apply post-conviction, are deemed sufficient to address requirements similar to those in Sub-section (5) of Section 143A. Consequently, Section 148 does not create any fresh disability akin to that created by Section 143A.
The court emphasizes that the decision in Surinder Singh Deswal Case stands on a different footing due to its interpretation of Section 148, which operates at the appellate stage. The judgment in G.J. Raja Case does not align with the appellants' argument, as it addresses different provisions and stages of the legal process compared to the Surinder Singh Deswal Case.